look into long-term strategic issues, such as finding a common ground on dealing with Iran, for which the US is clearly seeking a regime change.  

But the US hopes that if a formula is found to satisfy Turkey on its demands concerning the PKK, then this might allow Washington to convince Ankara forego their energy deal with Iran mentioned by Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Güler in İstanbul last weekend.

In July, Iran and Turkey signed a memorandum of understanding that would pave the way for $3.5 billion worth of Turkish investment in Iran's South Pars gas field. The US has objected to the agreement, urging Ankara to cut business ties with Iran over its failure to suspend its nuclear energy program.

As part of a policy intended to improve relations with its immediate Muslim neighbors, including Iran, Ankara prefers to keep dialogue with Tehran as a means to maintain some means of influencing Iranian policies that may have a direct impact on itself, such as Turkish trade with Central Asia through Iran.

But the US is still hoping that it will convince Ankara to back its policies on Iran, including its refusal to rule out a military option if Tehran insists on proceeding with its nuclear program.

For example, Ian Lesser, a senior US strategist, answering Turkish news station NTV's questions last week, voiced his hope that if Turkey and the US find common ground on the PKK issue, then this will pave the way for Washington to press Ankara on Iran. Similarly, Professor Beril Dedeoğlu of Galatasary University conjectured in a weekend interview with daily Sabah that in return for the extradition of a senior PKK leader Washington will ask Ankara to take a stance against Iran.

For Iran, taking sides with Turkey, a close US ally, has appeared as a golden opportunity to anger Washington and to give the impression that there are serious rifts between the two allies.

Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, for example, made a surprise visit to Ankara last Thursday prior to the start of the İstanbul summit that brought together Iraq's neighboring countries and other concerned powers. The real reason behind Mottaki's visit to Ankara was an intention to mediate between Iraq and Turkey on the issue of the PKK problem in northern Iraq. Despite its policy of improving ties with neighboring countries, Ankara is rational enough to be aware of Iran's desire to become a leading figure in the disputes among its neighbors. Thus, Mottaki was told that that Turkey did not need a mediator since it has an ongoing dialogue with Iraq on the PKK issue.

I would like to think that while Ankara has been pursuing an energy deal with Iran for its own national interest, it has also been bearing in mind Iran's real intentions of poking its nose into regional affairs, including Iraq. Many Turks also do not seem to remember the long years of Iran's support for the PKK as part of Tehran's goal of using this terrorist organization to destabilize Turkey.

But now facing a real threat from the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), an extension of the PKK based in Iran, Iranian security forces have intensified operations against this organization. Those operations are taking place in the midst of news reports that PKK terrorists based in northern Iraq are fleeing to Iran to find sanctuary at PJAK camps as Turkey has intensified its threats of an incursion. Iran is finally feeling the heat as PJAK stands as a major threat to its national interests.

The US, which has included the PKK in its list of terrorist organizations, has, however, refrained from pursuing the same policy for PJAK. This alone displays the degree of the US's distaste over Iran's current regime and its desire to find a means to distance Ankara from Tehran. But US success will mainly depend on Washington's determination over rendering the PKK in northern Iraq ineffective.

LALE SARIIBRAHIMOGLU