To talk or not to talk to the Iraqi Kurds? For Ankara that seems to be the question. The military is visibly against this idea. The government is in favor of it. The bureaucracy, for its part, is divided.

Many in the Foreign Ministry believe such dialogue is not only necessary but also inevitable. Others see it the way the military does and interpret it as “caving into terrorism.” That of course is a reference to the fact that the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) appears to be enjoying a safe haven in northern Iraq and the regional Kurdish leadership has done little about their presence.

  Turkey's highest-ranking military officer, Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt, made it clear how the military views this matter during his recent visit to Washington. As far as they are concerned, the PKK is being provided with explosives and logistic support by the Iraqi Kurdish leadership and thus there can be no dialogue with them, at least until this ends.

  The Iraqi Kurds of course deny this allegation and are calling for proof that they are helping the PKK in this way. But they do not deny that they are talking to the PKK to try and get it to mend its ways. They have also made it clear that they will not fight the PKK for Turkey's sake (even if they have done so in the past for their own sake).

  Given this backdrop the realists and pragmatists in Ankara argue that the way to solve the PKK issue, as well as other bones of contention, is to engage the Iraqi Kurds in a productive dialogue that serves mutual interests and to also show them, in this way, that they are being taken seriously as a regional entity.

  This idea is anathema, of course, to members of an establishment that only 20 years ago was denying that there were any Kurds in Turkey. The notion of bestowing on the Iraqi Kurds the benefit of de facto recognition now as a separate entity is therefore too much to swallow, given the connotations vis-à-vis Turkey's Kurds.

  But the tide of reality appears to be guiding Turkey in the direction of the pragmatists, despite all the angry talk that may be emanating from the civilian and military quarters. The statement issued after last Friday's meeting of the National Security Council (MGK) is proof that reason usually prevails in Ankara in the end, despite the difficulties it may have taken to get there.

  By pointing to the “political” and “diplomatic” tracks that have to be followed in trying to address the issue of the PKK in northern Iraq, as well as other issues such as the future status of Kirkuk, the MGK was basically advising the government to pursue the civilian track, and putting the military track on the backburner.

  Imbedded in this is of course the awareness that there is really no other track for Turkey to follow anyway other than the political and diplomatic ones. Unless of course, the PKK issue takes on an uncontrollable and burning dimension or a mass slaughter of Turkmen by Kurds starts in Kirkuk. That would of course bring the right of intervention, firstly on security grounds and secondly on humanitarian grounds.

  But for those who think that another type of intervention by Turkey is on the way, designed to stymie the political ambitions of the Iraqi Kurds, well that seems unlikely. For that to happen Ankara would have had to be taken over by “neocon-like” adventurism, which is not the case as yet.

  Whatever the “deep state” may think, it is clear that there is a “real state” in Turkey. The “real state” understands the meaning of “raison d'etat” and is aware of the threat posed by playing to the public gallery on issues that can affect the country's foreign policy negatively for years, if not for decades, to come.

Semih İdiz